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^STRACT M0^EREY, CAL1F0Rn'a 93940
This thesis relates the fact that, in the past, our ASW
community
has placed great (and justifiable) emphasis in detection and classifi-
cation of submarines, while a serious lag in tactical procedures
has
developed. In order to alleviate this problem, it was felt that a
syste-
matic approach be taken which utilizes the principles of
Operations
Research.
By examining submarine warfare from the viewpoint of the
Soviet
Union, a resource allocation problem has been devised which
compares
the various submarine classes and the possible mission areas
in which
they may be assigned. Characteristics and available numbers
of submarines
were estimated, and the resulting allocation of forces was
determined.
Although the analysis presented was based on hypothesized data,
the strength in this approach lies in its flexibility and a
wide range
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1. SUBMARINE TYPES AND MISSION AREAS 1?

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The threat of submarine attack has been, from the period of the
United States Civil War to the present, one of the most perplexing pro-
blems in warfare. A continuing struggle has been waged to produce new
and more sophisticated detection devices and weaponry to combat this
threat. Yet, with the advent of each anti-submarine measure has come
increasingly sophisticated submarines and their associated striking
powers. Tactics, too, have followed this continual see- saw in an effort
by each side to gain some slight advantage over the other.
Today, the anti-submarine warfare community -finds itself in a posi-
tion of having to contend with a large variety of modern nuclear and
conventional submarines, each with special operating characteristics and
tasked with distinct operational objectives.
It has been noted that, "our usual attitude is along lines of long,
reliable detection ranges with excellent classification characteristics."
In essence, we have placed great (and justifiable) emphasis in detection
and classfication, while a serious lag in tactical procedures has deve-
loped. In view of the variety of undersea weapons platforms our poten-
tial adversaries are continually producing, we must take positive and
carefully formulated corrective measures to alleviate this situation.
This paper utilizes the principles of Operations Analysis to direct
our anti-submarine tactical methodology toward the specific threats we
are most likely to face in our various naval operations. By accepting
the premise that the Soviet Union has developed a systematic allocation
Anti- Submarine Warfare Laboratory Report No. NADC-AW-N5906,
Future Detection and Classification Methods in Anti-fubmarine Warfare
(U), p. 1, 5 March 1959 (SECRET document).

of its submarine resources, we will be able to anticipate both the





It is the goal of this paper to provide a systematic approach
toward examining Soviet submarine resources, the various mission areas
in which these resources may be utilized, and ultimately, the alloca-
tion of these assets. With full realization of the rapidly expanding
Soviet naval posture and the recent advances of their technology, it is
reasonable to assume that they currently employ Operations Research/
Systems Analysis principles in much the same manner as do Western
scientists. In this regard, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union
S.G. Gorshkov stated, "We have had to cease comparing the number of
warships of one or another type and their total displacement (or the number
of guns in a salvo, or the weight of this salvo), and turn to a more
complex, but also more correct appraisal of the striking and defensive
power of ships, based on a mathematical analysis of their capabilities
2
and quantitative characteristics."
Putting ourselves behind the desk of the top military decision makers
in the Kremlin we will view the submarine warfare picture through "red
colored glasses" and develop an optimal solution to the problem of
submarine allocation. By adopting this method of analysis we will
determine a rational approach we might expect the Soviet analysists to
take in submarine mission assignments, and will therefore facilitate
optimizing U.S. ASW tactics to counter our most likely opponents.
Visualize, if you will, Admiral Gorshkov calling to his office, the
leaders of the Soviet Navy. He has before him, two charts; one showing
2 Gorshkov, S. G., "Navies in War and in Peace, ' United States Naval
Institute Proceedings, Vol. 100, Number 1, p. 19-20, January 197^.
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the sixteen submarine types currently serving the fleet, and the
other showing the ten missions on which these submarines are likely
to be employed. Figure 1 lists the submarines and missions under
consideration. To the leaders assembled before him, Admiral Gorshkov
assigns the task of determining an "optimal" allocation of the
submarine fleet. The scenario he prescribes is one in which the U.S.
has refused to heed numerous grave warnings issued by the Soviet
Union. As a result of repeated U.S. threats to the freedom of the
Soviet people, all-out war is close at hand.
Upon leaving Admiral Gorshkov 's office, the leaders decide to
present this problem to their military analysists.
After several weeks, the Naval Analysis Branch presents to
the leaders, a report containing several alternatives from which




Table I displays a resource-mission matrix in which the
pertinent submarine capabilities and limitations have been
examined in order to determine which of the mission areas each
type of submarine would be likely to be assigned. This table shows
that four of the original six mission areas have been subdivided.
The anti- convoy mission has been expanded to include missions whose
sole objective is to sink merchant vessels, and missions tasked with
It is important to note that to preclude the necessity of security
classification, submarine characteristics and total numbers available
have been approximated, and are presented for purposes of illustration.
These numbers are consistent with those currently available in
unclassified sources.

destroying specific cargos (petroleum, steel, armament, etc.). The
anti-United States Task Group mission area has been subdivided into
missions aimed at placing aircraft carriers out of commission, and
missions designed to destroy carrier defenses. The missions designed
to strike continental U.S. targets have been divided into those to strike
industrial areas and those to strike SAC bases. Barrier patrols have
been redefined to be patrols to counter the submarine threat, and
barriers to counter the surface ship threat.
The characteristics for each submarine type listed in Table I were
used to determine possible missions for each submarine class. Ranges
have been divided into short (s), medium (M), and long (l). Speeds
are listed as slow (S) for those whose maximum submerged speed is less
than, or equal to sixteen knots, and fast (F), for those capable of
submerged speeds in excess of sixteen knots. The category of power was
divided into conventional (c), and nuclear (N). Weapons loads for the
various submarines are torpedoes (T), guided missiles (G), and ballis-
tic missiles (B). Notice that, in all cases, those classes of submarines
which are armed with missiles also carry torpedoes. In addition,
because it is unreasonable to expect that all submarines are available
at any given time, the number of each submarine type available has been
chosen to be eighty percent of the totals.
In Table I, an X represents the decision that a submarine of type i
would be a reasonable choice to fulfill mission j. For example, a Z
class sub might be assigned to counter merchant shipping, but due to
the submarine's characteristics, would be a poor choice in a role against
U.S. Task Groups.
The decision was made to formulate a linear program which maximized
the utility of the submarine fleet, subject to the constraints that all
10

mission areas were to be fulfilled, and that the number of submarines of
each type was not to be exceeded.
In order to meet this objective, each class of submarine was compared
with a reference class (in this case, the Y class was chosen). The
subjective determination was then made as to the "value" of a submarine
of type i. Based on the age of each class and its overall contribution
toward insuring the security of the U.S.S.R., these values were assigned
to the classes as shown in Table II. For example, one Y class submarine
is "worth" nine E class subs. Another way of viewing these values is to
answer the question; "The loss of how many E class submarines is equal
to the loss of one Y class sub? " Due to the nature of the objective
function, and in order to facilitate computations, a base value of one
was chosen for the Y class submarines.
Next, the marginal utility of each submarine in its possible mission
areas was determined. By examining the requirements of each mission,
and by knowing how much a given submarine contributes toward the mission,
these quantities were calculated. Marginal utility values are shown in
Table II. For example, each H class submarine represents three percent
of the total requirement needed against U.S. SAC bases. Stated in
different terms, using only H class submarines to counter U.S. SAC bases,
33.3 subs would be needed.
In mathematical notation, the linear program is as follows:
w * 10 15Maximize














i3 > o V *» J
where V. . s the value of a submarine
" of type i on mission j\
X. . = the total number of
1J submarines of type i used
on mission j,
b. = the total number of type i
submarines available,
a. . = the marginal utility of
1J type i
15
Note that the expression \ a. .X. .=1 ty . is the constraint that
5 I^L
all missions be fulfilled .
With the objective function and the constraint equations listed
above, and the marginal utilities and values shown in Table II, a com-
puter program was written to determine an optimal allocation of the
available submarines. Table III illustrates the values determined.
It was seen that in several instances two or three classes of
submarines were similar in that they were capable of performing the same
missions, and had been assigned similar values and marginal utilities.
To simplify the linear program, a revised matrix utilizing combined
marginal utilities, and averaged values was determined. This matrix is
shown in Table IV. Table V displays the corresponding solutions to the
linear program. It is readily seen that combining classes of submarines
While each submarine type has been assigned a value, it must be
noted that V-^-; is zero in many cases. For example, the value of a Z
class sub against merchant shipping is 20, while its value against CVA's
is zero.
' In the context of this analysis "fulfilled" means that the missions
are to be accomplished to some input degree. For example, to fulfill
the convoy mission does not necessarily mean that all convoy ships are




affected the solution very little.
The computer analysis used in the preparation of this paper was
conducted using the Mathematical Programming System (MPS-360) package
in conjunction with an IBM-360 computer. It is felt that MPS-360 is an
excellent tool in such analyses, and has special merits, in that the
capability to perform sensitivity analyses is incorporated into the
system. A listing of the computer program and output follows Section




III. DISCUSSION AMD CONCLUSIONS
It is recognized that in formulating the linear program described
in Section II from the viewpoint of the Soviet Union, a rather
"simplistic" approach was taken. Obviously, by utilizing detailed
intelligence information as inputs, outputs more closely approximating
the real world could have been obtained. In addition, by defining
marginal utility to mean "missions per submarine," some economists might
argue that it is unreasonable to expect that each submarine added to
a particular mission area contributes the same amount toward fulfilling
the goal of the mission as did the previous submarine (i.e., is it
reasonable to assume that marginal utilities are constant? )
.
Often, we have been content to rely on World War II methods which
were successful before the emergence of the nuclear submarine. From
these outdated tactics we have devised tactics for implementation in
today's Navy. Our current tactical publications consist of numerous
procedures limited in scope, and general in nature. Is it not reason-
able to expect that with the specialized nature of our current naval
missions we may anticipate encountering adversaries equally specialized?
Such a redundant question should certainly point towards devising new
tactics designed to meet a modern challenge.
A closer examination of the methods presented in this paper reveals
that through the use of the linear program we are able to conduct
meaningful sensitivity analyses. By fixing one input we may examine
the range of other variables for which a given solution remains unchanged.
For example, we may ask the question, "Assuming that the characteristics
of the other classes of Soviet submarines do not change, how will the
adversaries we may expect to face vary as a particular class of
Ik

submarines is phased out of service, or new classes are introduced?
"
In addition, we may use the outputs generated by this model to
evaluate current tactics. For example, by analyzing a given tactic we
may be able to predict the type of submarine characteristics most vul-
nerable to that tactic. Then by determining on which of our missions
we would be most likely to encounter those submarines, we will be able
to conduct more specific training to strengthen our capabilities. In
recent years there have been encouraging results from experimental
tactics evaluated during fleet exercises . Certainly, the information
resulting from this linear program can serve to amplify our belief that
these new tactical methods have merit in given circumstances, and we
will be able to evaluate alternative courses of action.
Perhaps even more importantly, use of these methods will enable us
to evaluate the overall effects of a change in tactics in a given area.
For example, a new CVA screening tactic cannot be expected to result
in greater survivability of the CVA if the enemy elects to commit
proportionally greater submarine assets to the anti-CVA mission. In
this case, the value of the new screen tactic will be manifested in
increased survivability of the target of some other submarine mission.
The identity of this target, and the magnitude of the savings might be
estimated from this program.
Application of the linear program presented here is not restricted
to the all-out war scenario described, nor is it limited to the character-
istics of the submarines listed. In a limited war in which one or more
missions described in the analysis are not applicable, the linear program




established or as new missions are foreseen, this approach may also be
used.
Without question there are many avenues yet to be examined in regard
to the implementation of such an approach to our ASW. In particular,
devising new tactics suggested by the output of the linear program will
require detailed development of the input variables. When assigning
actual marginal utilities to submarine missions, the scope and nature
of the missions must be very thoroughly analyzed. For example, by
stating that 20 submarines of type i are required to fulfill mission j,
we must be willing to estimate both the mission objectives and the sub-
marine capabilities in considerable detail.
It has not been the intent of this paper to provide "the" answer to
the difficulties facing our current ASW endeavors. Rather, the methods
presented here are offered as one logical approach to ASW, designed to
eliminate some of the guesswork and outmoded bases which now serve as
foundation for much of our efforts.
Used as a tool, the linear program and extensions of the methods
presented here will enable our policy makers to take a fresh look at the
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X105 VALUE L5. OOOOO SUB10 1.00000
XL05 MIS5 . 0^000
X106 SUBIO I. OOOOO
X107 SUBIO 1.00000
X1O0 -VALUE 15. OOOOO —SUR10 1. OOOOO
X108 M!S8 .07000
X109 VALUE 15.00000 SUBIO I. OOOOO
X109 M !S9 .05000




MPS-PTF4 EXECUTOR. MPS/360 V2-MIO




SUB1 1 V, 00000
X112 SURll 1.00000
X113 VAIUF 13.00000 SURll L. 00000
X113 MIS3 .10000
X114 SURll 1.00000
X115 . VALUE 13.00000 SU811 1.00000
XU5 MISS .03000
X116 SURll 1.00000
x 1 1 7 -SUB 1
1
K GOOOO
XU8 VALUE 13.00000 SURll 1. 00000
X118 MISS .07000
XU9 VALUE 13.00000 SUBll -ItOOOOO
Xll° MIS9 .C7000
XlllO VALUE 13.00000 SUB 11 1.00000
XlllO MIS 10 .09000
X121 SUB12 1.00000
X122 SUR12 1. GOOOO
X123 SUR12 1.00000
X124 VALUE 9.00000 SUB12 1.00000
X124 -MIS4 . 12000
X125 SUP12 1.00000
X 126 SUB 12 1. 00000 _..___
X127 VALUE 9.00000 SU812 1.00000
X127 MIS7 .03000
X 128 VALUE 9. 00000——-SU81 2 1-.00000
X128 MIS 8 .06000
X129 SUR12 1.00000
X1210 SUR12 -1.00000
X131 SUB 13 1.00000
X132 SUB13 I. 00000
X133 SUB 13 1.00000
X134 SUR13 I. 00000
X13S SUB13 1.00000—
X136 SUR13 I. 00000
X1B7 VAIUE 7 . 00000 SJ813 1.00000
X137 . MIS7 .03000
X138 SU^13 1.00000
X130 SUP13 . 1. COOOO
X1310 SUR13 1.00000
X141 SUR14 1. COOOO
X142 SUB 14 1. GOOOO
X143 SUR14 1.00000
X144 SUR14 1.00000
XT 45 SUB 14 1.00000
X146 VAUJP 5.00000 SUB14 1.00000
X146 MIS6 .08000
Xl4f VALLE "5.00000 SUB14 1.00000
X147 MIS7 .06000









MPS-PTF4 EXFCUTOR. MPS/360 V2-M10
RHS
:NDATA
X1410 VALUF 5.00000 SUB14 1.00000
X1410 MJSIO .06000
x 1 5 1 SUB 1
5
L-. 00000-
XL52 SUB 15 l.COOOO
X153 SUR15 l.COOOO
X154 SUR15 1.00000
X155 SUB15 I. 00000
X156 VALUE 1.00000 .S.UB15 1.00000
X156 MIS6 .09000
X157 VALUE 1.00000 SUB15 1.00000
- X 1 5 7 M IS 7 .0^000
X15B SUB15 1. 00000
XI 50 SUB 15 1.00000
X1510 SUB 15 -IvOOOOO
AL0T1 _SUB1 .. 3.00000 .._.S'JR2 4.00003
ALH T L SUB3 32.00000 SUB4 12.00000
ALHT1 SUB5 B. 00000 SUB6 40.00000
AlOTi SUB 7 4.00000 —SUB8 12.00000
ALOTl SUB9 L6. 00000 SUB10 12.00000
ALOTl SUB11 12.00000 SJ012 20.00000
Al (TT1 SUB 13 16.00000 S'JRl^ 8.00000
ALOT l SUBl^ 32.00000 M I SI 1.00000
ALPTi MIS2. l.COOOO MI S3 1.00000
ALHTl MTS4 1.00000 MIS5 I. 00000
ALHT1 MIS6 1.00000 MIS? 1.00000
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